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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Are Acme's pH, BOD, and TSS violations of its 1974 and
1987 NPDES permits moot where Acme has failed to
prove that it has put in remedial measures which clearly
eliminate the cause of those violations?
II. Is a holder of an NPDES permit with a new effluent limi-
tation liable for violations in an enforcement action while
the state certification and limitation are being
appealed? ii
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The opinion of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Union granting National Council for the Protec-
tion of the Environment's and the State of New Union's mo-
tion for summary judgment is set forth in the record at pages
11-12.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The jurisdictional statement is omitted pursuant to Rule
4(c) of the 1989 National Environmental Law Moot Court
Competition.
STATUTES AT ISSUE
Section 1365(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (1986), and section 1369(b)(2) of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (1986), are set out in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Statement of Facts
Acme Industries, Inc. (Acme) operates an organic chemi-
cal manufacturing facility in the City of Fairwater, New
Union (R. 3). Acme discharges its wastewater into the
Fairwater River, which is heavily used for recreational pur-
poses (R. 3).
In 1974, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) first issued Acme a National Pollution Dis-
charge2 Elimination System (NPDES) permit requiring
Acme to install and operate a wastewater treatment facility by
July 1, 1977 (R. 3). The NPDES permit set effluent limita-
tions on pH, biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), and total
suspended solids (TSS) (R. 3). These effluent limitations were
certified by the State of New Union (State) under section 401
of the Clean Water Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), as nec-
essary to meet the State's water quality standards (R. 3).
Prior to July 1987, Acme operated under its 1974 NPDES
permit which was extended by operation of law when Acme
filed an application for reissuance of the permit in 1979 (R. 4).
Acme never met the BOD or TSS limitations established in
[Vol. 6
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the 1974 permit on a consistent basis (R. 4, 8). The EPA is-
sued a new permit in July of 1987, which included a toxicity
effluent limitation that New Union had required in its certifi-
cation as necessary to meet state water quality standards (R.
4). The 1987 permit contained the same pH effluent limitation
as the 1974 permit, but increased the allowable discharge of
BOD and TSS (R. 5). By August of 1987, Acme's BOD and
TSS discharges were generally within the 1987 limitations, al-
though it had at least fourteen violations in each of the previ-
ous two winters (R. 8).
NCPE promptly challenged the BOD and TSS effluent
limitations established in the 1987 permit under 40 C.F.R.
Part 124, asserting that they were not legal under the newly
enacted "anti-degradation" provision in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)_13
(1988) (R. 6). Acme challenged the toxicity limitation in the
same proceeding (R. 6). These challenges are currently pend-
ing before the EPA (R. 6). Acme has also challenged the
State's certification of the 1987 permit in state court alleging
several state grounds (R. 4). The state court dismissed Acme's
challenge for lack of jurisdiction (R. 4-5).
Acme violated its pH limitation on a regular basis about
thirty percent of the time when a manually operated treat-
ment system was utilized (R. 6). Since Acme installed a mech-
anized treatment system in June of 1985, Acme has violated
the pH effluent limitation when a power outage caused its
mechanized treatment system to fail (R. 6-7).
Acme has violated the toxicity effluent limitation on a
continuous basis since the limit was first established in 1987,
including a two week period every winter (R. 8, 11-12).
II. Proceeding Below
The United States District Court for the District of New
Union held that the pH, BOD, and TSS violations were not
likely to continue and granted Acme's motion for summary
judgment (R. 10, 11). The district court held that Acme vio-
lated the toxicity effluent limitation on each occasion a toxic-
ity test was conducted, and granted NCPE's and the State's
motion for summary judgment (R. 12).
19891
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court had jurisdiction to decide the merits
of _L NCPE's complaint even though Acme is not currently vi-
olating its NPDES permit. Acme bears the burden of proving
that it is absolutely clear that the cause of those violations
cannot reasonably be expected to recur. The district court ap-
plied the wrong standard of mootness and therefore errone-
ously granted summary judgment for Acme. Material ques-
tions of fact remain as to whether Acme has put in place
remedial measures that completely eradicate the causes of its
violations.
Because the Clean Water Act recognizes no de minimus
exception for intermittent or sporadic violations, Acme is lia-
ble for its single pH violation. As of the time the complaint
was filed, Acme's pH violations are continuing because they
have not provided contingency arrangements for their auto-
mated lime-addition system.
Acme's intermittent BOD and TSS winter violations and
sporadic pH violations are just as much a violation of the
Clean Water Act as a polluter who is continually violating the
Act.
For the purposes of this enforcement action, Acme is
bound by the limitations of its 1974 permit which it has con-
tinuously violated. The 1987 BOD and TSS limitations are
stayed 'for the purpose of this action. Even if the less stringent
BOD and TSS limitations are considered valid, Acme is con-
tinuously violating them because it has failed to put in place
remedial measures which clearly eliminate the cause of these
violations.
The civil penalties attributable to Acme's pH, BOD, and
TSS violations are not moot even if injunctive relief is now
held to12 be moot.
Congress expressed an intent to have the states play a
major role in the reduction of the nation's water pollution in
the Clean Water Act. The proper forum to review the state's
certification is state court. The plain language of the Clean
Water Act states that the substantive requirements of an
NPDES permit is not reviewable in a civil or criminal enforce-
[Vol. 6
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ment proceeding.
Acme is precluded from having its 1987 permit judicially
reviewed because it has not exhausted its administrative rem-
edies as required by the Clean Water Act and its regulations.
Acme is strictly liable for its toxicity violations regardless
of its current appeals. The district court correctly granted
summary judgment for NCPE and New Union because the
undisputed facts establish that Acme is liable for its toxicity
violations.-16
ARGUMENT
I. ACME'S PH, BOD, AND TSS VIOLATIONS ARE CON-
TINUING VIOLATIONS OF ITS NPDES PERMIT
AND THEREFORE NCPE'S CITIZEN SUIT IS NOT
MOOT.
NCPE's citizen suit was properly brought under section
505 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "the Act"), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) (1986). Where federal or state authorities fail to en-
force a discharger's compliance with its National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit, private
citizens may commence a civil action against any person al-
leged to be "in violation" of the conditions of either a federal
or state permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). In Gwaltney of Smith-
field v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 108 S.Ct.
376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987), the Supreme Court resolved a
split among the courts of appeal by holding that a citizen suit
could not be maintained for wholly past violations. 108 S.Ct.
at 382-83. The Court specifically held, however, that a federal
court has jurisdiction under section 1365(a) where citizen-
plaintiffs make a good faith allegation of a continuing or in-
termittent violation. 108 S.Ct. at 384. NCPE alleged in its
complaint that Acme has violated and continues to violate the
terms of its NPDES permits (R. 2), so therefore jurisdiction
was proper under Gwaltney.
Although Acme is not currently violating its NPDES per-
mit, the district court had jurisdiction to decide the merits of
NCPE's complaint. The Gwaltney Court concluded that a
good faith allegation was all that was necessary for purposes
19891
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of subjecti! matter jurisdiction because section 1365 states
that a citizen suit may be brought against any discharger "al-
leged to be in violation" of the Act. 108 S.Ct. at 384. Drawing
on the legislative history the Court concluded that "an inter-
mittent polluter - one who violates permit limitations one
month of every three - is just as much 'in violation' of the Act
as a continuing violator." Id. Therefore, the fact that Acme
may not have been violating its permit when the complaint
was filed or even afterward is of no consequence to the court's
subject matter jurisdiction.
Acme bears the burden of proving that the violations are
not continuing and therefore moot. See Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct.
at 386. The Court recognized that since only a good faith alle-
gation of a continuing violation was necessary for jurisdiction,
defendant polluters would need protection from lawsuits that
become meritless due to the defendant's subsequent compli-
ance. Id. The Court therefore held that a polluter may move
for summary judgment on the ground that the violations have
become moot. Id. However, to protect plaintiffs from defend-
ants who seek to evade sanctions by predictably claiming they
have come into compliance, the Court set a very heavy burden
on the polluter. Id.
The district court in the present case applied the wrong
standard of mootness and therefore erroneously granted sum-
mary judgment for Acme (R. 11). This court reviews that
holding de novo by determining from the record whether no
genuine issues ofI18 material fact exist. Wheeler v. Hurdman,
825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 503
(1988); International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and
Agric. Implement Workers of America, Inc. v. National Right
to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Found., Inc., 781 F.2d 928
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Grisby v. CMI Corp., 765 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir.
1986). Likewise, this court reviews de novo the district court's
determination that a violation is moot. See Sample v. John-
son, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1019 (1986).
Chief Judge Romulus held that a violation becomes moot
if it merely "ceased after the suit was filed but prior to trial"
(R. 10). In contrast, the Gwaltney Court held that to have a
[Vol. 6
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case dismissed as moot the polluter must "demonstrate that it
is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur." 108 S.Ct. at 386 (quot-
ing United States v..Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S.
199, 203 (1953)) (emphasis in original).
Taken to its logical extreme, under the district court's ap-
proach a polluter could temporarily shut down its operation,
have the case dismissed as moot, and then recommence its
polluting in violation of the Act. Voluntary cessation of alleg-
edly illegal conduct does not deprive the court of the power to
hear and determine the case, in that it does not make the case
moot. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631
(1979). The rule adopted by the Chief Judge Romulus in the
instant case not only violates the standard enunciated in-L2
Gwaltney but also frustrates the Clean Water Act's goal to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1986).
This court should reverse and remand this case because mate-
rial questions of fact remain regarding whether Acme has put
in place remedial measures which made it absolutely clear
that its pH, BOD, and TSS violations would not reasonably
be expected to recur when NCPE's complaint was filed. See
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 844 F.2d
170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), on remand from, 108 S.Ct. 376; Kauf-
man v. Johnston, 454 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1972).
Under both the majority and concurring opinions in
Gwaltney, NCPE has to prove the existence of ongoing viola-
tions at some point to prevail on the merits. Gwaltney, 844
F.2d 170, 171 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1988). At the same time, however,
Acme must prove that it has put remedial measures in place
that clearly eliminate the cause of the violation. See
Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 387 (Scalia, J. concurring); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
692 F. Supp. 801, 815 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
A. The pH violations are not moot because Acme has
not proved that its remedial measures have clearly
eliminated the cause of its pH violations and NCPE
1989]
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has proven that the violations are continuing.
The district court granted summary judgment for Acme
because it believed that it was unlikely that Acme's pH viola-
tions would recur, that is that they were moot (R. 10-11)._12o
Because both parties have moved for summary judgment
in this case (R. 2) the court must draw all reasonable infer-
ences from the undisputed facts in favor of the nonmovant on
each motion. DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 811 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1987); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 804
n. 2 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Although the Supreme Court held that long-standing
principles of mootness should be applied to section 1365 ac-
tions, they did not have to determine how and when a viola-
tion's mootness is to be judged because neither of the parties
argued mootness in their briefs. Benson, Clean Water Act
Citizen Suits After Gawltney: Applying Mootness Principles
in Private Enforcement Actions, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
143, 153 (1988). On remand in Gwaltney the Fourth Circuit
held that citizen-plaintiffs could prove ongoing violations
(continuing or intermittent) in either of two ways: (1) by
proving that violations continue on or after the date the com-
plaint is filed; or (2) by adducing evidence from which a rea-
sonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a
recurrence of intermittent or sporadic violations. Chesapeake
Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th
Cir. 1988). Accord Sierra Club v. Union Oil of California, 853
F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988).
The correct time to measure mootness in this case is
when the suit was filed. See Gwaltney, 844 F.2d at 172. On
remand the Fourth Circuit stated:I 1
Consistent with the guidance of the Supreme Court ma-
jority and concurring opinions, the district court may
wish to consider whether remedial actions were taken to
cure violations, the ex ante probability that such remedial
measures would be effective, and any other evidence
presented during the proceedings that bears on whether
the risk of the defendant's c6ntinued violation had been
[Vol. 6
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completely eradicated when citizen-plaintiffs filed suit.
Id. (emphasis added).
Gwaltney, 844 F.2d at 172.
Thus the relevant question is whether as of July 1986 Acme
had put in place remedial measures that completely eradi-
cated the possibility of a recurring pH violation.
Although no pH violations have occurred since the com-
plaint was filed in July 1986 there is evidence from which the
district court could have found a reasonable likelihood of that
violation recurring. The last pH violation occurred due to a
power outage after Acme had mechanized its lime addition
system (R. 6). It can be inferred that a violation may occur
again because Acme has done nothing to provide contingency
arrangements in the event such an outage reoccurs.
The fact that the last pH violation occurred in 1985
should be of no consequence to the resolution of this issue. In
Gwaltney the citizen suit was filed in June 1984. The last
chlorine violation had occurred in October 1982 and the last
total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) violation occurred in May
1984. The district court on remand held that Gwaltney was
liable for both chlorine and TKN violations because the reme-
dial measures put in place after the last violation did not re-
move the likelihood of future violations. Chesapeake Bay
Found. v._L2 Gwaltney of Smithfield, 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1079
(E.D. Va. 1988). Similarly, in the present case Acme has put
in place remedial measures, but there still exists a likelihood
of recurring pH violations.
Although the district court did not reach Acme's affirma-
tive defense of upset (R. 10 n.4), the requirements imposed in
,meeting that defense show by analogy that Acme is still in
violation of its pH limitation. An upset is an exceptional inci-
dent that must be unintentional, temporary, and beyond the
reasonable control of the permittee. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)
(1987). Furthermore, the upset defense is unavailable when vi-
olations have been caused by improperly designed or inade-
quate treatment facilities. Id. Acme's pH violation would not
fall within the definition of an upset because its treatment fa-
cilities are improperly designed in that they do not provide
19891
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for a backup manual lime-addition system or a backup power
source. These contingencies are well within Acme's control es-
pecially since prior to the current system Acme was manually
adding lime (R. 6). By analogy, this court should 'hold that
Acme's pH violation is continuing because their remedial
measures have not clearly eliminated the cause of that viola-
tion, and even if they had, Acme would not be entitled to the
upset defense. See Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 387.
The suit for the pH violation is not moot and may be
maintained even though only one violation occurred between
June 1985 and July 1986. It has been recently held that an
action may be2 3 maintained under section 1365(a) for even
minor or infrequent violations of the Act. Sierra Club v.
Union Oil of Cal., 813 F.2d 1480, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1987) va-
cated 108 S.Ct. 1102 (1988), reinstated, 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1988); see also Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical
Corp., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, in Gwaltney
the court of appeals on remand stated that "[i]ntermittent or
sporadic violations do not cease to be ongoing until the date
when there is no real likelihood of repetition." 844 F.2d at 172
(emphasis added).
Judicial recognition that a citizen enforcement action can
be maintained for even a single violation is bolstered by the
fact that all courts which have faced infrequent or sporadic
violations have held that the Clean Water Act provides no ex-
ception for de minimis violations. Union Oil, 813 F.2d at 1491;
Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F.
Supp. 1397, 1418 (D.Conn. 1987); Student Pub. Interest
Group of N.J. v. A.T. & T. Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp.
1190, 1206 (D.N.J. 1985). By relying on the fact that Acme
had violated its pH limitation once in the year preceding the
complaint, the district court implicitly recognized a de
minimis exception (R. 10). Not only is this in contrast to the
weight of authority, but it violates the Act's clear intention to
penalize any discharge of pollutants in violation of a permit.
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(d) (1986).
It is clear from the discussion above that NCPE has
proven the existence of ongoing pH violations and Acme has
failed to_114 meet its heavy burden. As Chief Judge Romulus
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correctly noted, the situation with the BOD and TSS viola-
tions is more complicated (R. 10), but it will become crystal
clear from the following discussion that Acme has not met its
burden here either.
B. NCPE has proven that Acme's violations of its BOD
and TSS limitations are continuirig and Acme failed
to prove that its remedial measures have completely
eliminated the cause of those violations.
1. Acme is in continuous violation of its 1974 limita-
tions which remain in effect for the purposes of
this suit.
The district court erroneously measured Acme's compli-
ance with its permit limitations at the time the motions were
decided (R. 11). As previously discussed in this brief at page
10 it is clear that the Supreme Court held in Gwaltney that
mootness is to be judged as of the date the suit was filed.
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 844 F.2d
170, 172 (4th Cir. 1988). When this suit was filed in July of
1986 the only NPDES permit that Acme had was its renewed
1974 permit (R. 11). The undisputed facts in the record make
clear that Acme never met its 1974 BOD and TSS limitations
(R. 8). Therefore, this court should hold that Acme's BOD
and TSS violations are not moot because it had not put in
place remedial measures which completely eradicated the
cause of those violations at the time the complaint was filed.
See Gwaltney, 844 F.2d at 172.
Moreover, even if Acme's performance is measured after
the_2 5 complaint was filed, when the changes in its manufac-
turing process were implemented, it was still continuously vio-
lating the 1974 limitations (R. 8) which are the only effective
limits for the purposes of this action. The district court cor-
rectly held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear NCPE's
challenge to the validity of Acme's reissued 1987 permit (R.
11). 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (1986). This legal conclusion is,
however, of no consequence to the disposition of the mootness
issue. The regulations covering judicial and administrative re-
view of permit limitations and conditions provide that after
1989]
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the EPA has issued a final permit for an existing source, any
interested person may request an evidentiary hearing before
the Regional Administrator. 40 C.F.R. § 124.74(a) (1987).
NCPE has made such a request which is pending before the
EPA (R. 6). While this formal request is pending on the valid-
ity of the 1987 BOD and TSS limitations, the regulations pro-
vide that the 1974 permit limitations remain in effect. See 40
C.F.R. § 124.60(c)(1) (1987). That section provides: "[i]f a re-
quest for a formal hearing is granted in whole or in part under
section 124.75 regarding a permit for an existing source . . .
the force and effect of the contested conditions of the final
permit shall be stayed." Id.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988), the citizen-
plaintiffs brought suit for violations of Outboard's NPDES
permit limitations for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's).
Under the state approved_1 6 permit system, Illinois had reis-
sued Outboard's 1983 permit in 1987 with stricter conditions.
Outboard appealed the conditions and also sought modifica-
tion. The district court held that for the purposes of
Gwaltney, Outboard was bound by its 1983 permit limitations
which it was held to be continuously violating. 692 F. Supp. at
814. Similarly, in the present case NCPE's appeal stays the
effect of Acme's 1987 BOD and TSS limitations, and keeps in
effect the 1974 limitations. Therefore, this court should re-
verse the district court and hold that Acme is continuously
violating its BOD and TSS violations, because the 1974 per-
mit remains in effect until its appeal is finally resolved.
2. Acme is in continuous violation of its 1987
limitations.
Even if the less stringent BOD and TSS limitations are
considered valid, Acme is continuously violating them because
as the Supreme Court made clear in Gwaltney, an intermit-
tent polluter is just as much "in violation" of the Act as a
continuous violator. 108 S.Ct. at 384. Acme has violated its
1987 BOD and TSS limitations over a two week period in
each of the last two winters (R. 8). Although they have put in
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place remedial measures aimed at meeting these limitations,
they have failed at least 28 times in the last two years (R. 8).
Intermittent or sporadic violations such as these do not cease
to be ongoing until there is no real likelihood of repetition.
See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
844 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Union Oil of
Cal., 853_17 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988). Since changing
their manufacturing process prior to August 1986, Acme has
done nothing to prevent further winter violations of its BOD
and TSS limitations (R. 8). Another winter is approaching
and it will undoubtedly be cold in New Union. To prevent
violations from occurring this winter, this court should hold
that these violations are not moot and that Acme is subject to
injunctive and monetary penalties. See Chesapeake Bay
Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078,
1079 (E.D. Va. 1988).
The facts and final resolution of Gwaltney make clear
that Acme's BOD and TSS violations are not moot. In
Gwaltney the evidence demonstrated that the defendant had
a history of repeated wintertime violations of its TKN limita-
tion. The most recent violations had occurred in the winter
preceding the filing of the citizen suit. Although no violations
had occurred after the complaint was filed, the district court
adduced from the expert testimony that as of the time the
complaint was filed there was a continuing likelihood of a re-
currence of the intermittent TKN violation. 688 F. Supp. at
1079. The court therefore held that Gwaltney was liable for its
violations and reinstated civil penalties. Id. at 1080. Similarly,
in the present case this court should hold that Acme is liable
for its BOD and TSS violations since cold weather occurs
every winter in New Union, and up to this time Acme has
done nothing to prepare for it.
The Clean Water Act does not provide exceptions for acts
of2-8 God which interfere with the functioning of a polluter's
treatment system. Congress intended that any discharge of
pollutants in violation of a permit limitation be penalized.
Student Pub. Interest Group of N.J. v. A.T. & T. Bell Labo-
ratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1206 (D.N.J. 1985); 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(a), 1319(d). Compliance with the Act is a matter of strict
19891
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liability and a defendant's intention to comply, or a good faith
attempt to do so does not excuse a violation. United States v.
Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); Connecti-
cut Fund for the Env't v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397,
1409 (D.Conn. 1987). In excusing Acme's winter violations of
its BOD and TSS limitations, the district court created an ex-
ception which does not exist in the Clean Water Act. If the
district court's decision is upheld it will be in violation of the
explicit intent of the Act to penalize all violations. See Sierra
Club v. Union Oil of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1491 (9th Cir.
1988).
Even if Acme had affirmatively pled the upset defense
and properly followed the procedures in 40 C.F.R. section
122.41, it would still be liable for the wintertime violations.
See Union Oil, 813 F.2d at 1490. The district court implicitly
held that Acme was excused from these violations due to up-
set (R. 11). Leaving aside the fact that it was Acme's responsi-
bility to plead and prove upset (40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)),
Acme's violations are not an upset because they are attributa-
ble to inadequately designed treatment facilities. In Union Oil
the_29 Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding of
upset for violations attributable to heavy rainfalls because the
plant was inadequately designed to deal with the normally ex-
pected rainfall. 813 F.2d at 1490. Similarly, Acme's treatment
system is inadequately designed to deal with regularly occur-
ring cold weather (R. 8). The fact that even the extraordinary
defense of upset is inapplicable is further evidence that
Acme's BOD and TSS violations are continuing and not moot.
C. Even if Acme's pH, BOD, and TSS violations are
now held to be moot, this case should not be dis-
missed because the civil penalties are not moot.
If this court holds that the pH, BOD, and TSS violations
are now moot because their is no real likelihood of recurrence,
but at the time the complaint was filed there was still a
chance of recurrence, the civil penalties for the past violations
still present a live controversy. Even though the Supreme
Court stated that citizens may seek civil penalties only in a
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suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation,
the Court did not say that civil penalties become moot if in-
junctive relief is unwarranted. Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 382.
The district court in this instance held that the entire case
had become moot because the violations had ceased after the
complaint was filed (R. 11). The concurring Justices in
Gwaltney suggested otherwise:
When a company has violated an effluent standard or lim-
itation it remains, for purposes of section 505(a), "in vio-
lation" of that standard or limitation so long as it has not
put in place remedial measures that-L20 clearly eliminate
the cause of the violation. It does not suffice to defeat
subject matter jurisdiction that the success of the at-
tempted remedies becomes clear months or even weeks
after the suit is filed. Subject matter jurisdiction "de-
pends on the state of things at the time the action is
brought"; if it existed when the suit was brought, "subse-
quent events" cannot "oust" the court of jurisdiction.
108 S.Ct. at 387.
The Supreme Court has held in other settings that when
a plaintiff seeks monetary or declaratory relief in addition to
an injunction, even if the injunction becomes moot the rest of
the suit survives. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416
U.S. 115, 122 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498-
99 (1969). Lower federal courts have also held this principle
applicable to government actions to enforce the Clean Water
Act. E.g., United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996,
1000 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, at least one court of appeals
has held this principle applicable to citizen suits as well. Paw-
tuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089,
1094 (1st Cir. 1986). In that pre-Gwaltney case the court fol-
lowed the good faith allegation rule ultimately adopted by the
Supreme Court. It held that "[a] plaintiff who makes allega-
tions warranting injunctive relief in good faith, judged objec-
tively, may recover a penalty judgment for past violations
even if the injunction proves unobtainable." Id. (emphasis
added).
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This approach seems especially appropriate in view of the
purposes and legislative history of section 1365. The Su-
preme_121 Court has recognized that the Clean Water Act al-
lows citizens to enforce the Act as private attorney generals.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981). Section 1365 allows citizens to
vindicate a public right which embodies a noneconomic inter-
est in clean water. See Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 at 221 (Comm. Print 1973).
A citizen-plaintiff's ability to enforce this public right is fur-
ther bolstered by the Act's authorization of civil penalties,
payable to the United States Treasury, in private enforcement
actions. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1986). This court should hold
that NCPE's claims for civil penalties survives, even if the in-
junctive relief is held to be moot because NCPE is acting as a
private attorney general enforcing the public's rights, under
section 1365.
II. ACME IS LIABLE FOR THE CONTINUING VIOLA-
TIONS OF ITS TOXICITY LIMITATION IN THIS
ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
In granting partial summary judgment for NCPE and the
State, the district court held that Acme was liable for viola-
tions of its 1987 toxicity limitation even though its appeal of
that limitation was pending before the EPA (R. 12). This
court reviews that holding de novo by determining from the
record whether no genuine issues of material fact exist. See,
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1987). The
court must draw all reasonable inferences from the undis-
puted facts in favor of Acme regarding this motion. See
DeValk Lincoln Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326, 329
(7th Cir. 1987).-22
A. The district court is without authority to review
New Union's certification of Acme's 1987 NPDES
permit.
Acme's 1987 NPDES permit added a toxicity effluent lim-
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itation because New Union believes it is necessary for the
achievement of its state water quality standards (R. 4). Acme
challenged the State's certification of this permit in state
court alleging several state grounds (R. 4-5). Ultimately, the
state court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction (R. 5).
It is unclear whether Acme attempted to appeal this decision
to a higher state court or whether relief was sought through
the New Union Department of Environmental Protection
("NUDEP").
The resolution of Acme's certification challenge is of no
consequence to the issue of liability for its toxicity violations,
because this issue cannot be decided in a federal administra-
tive or judicial forum. See Roosevelt Campobello Int'l. Park
Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982). The
Clean Water Act indicates that the federal courts are not the
appropriate forum in which to seek review of the certification
process. Id.
Congress expressed in the Clean Water Act an intent to
have the states play a major role in the reduction of the na-
tion's water pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1986). That sec-
tion provides that "[i]t is the policy of Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan
the2 3 development and use including restoration, preserva-
tion, and enhancement of land and water resources." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1986). Moreover, a discharger may not ob-
tain a federal license to construct or operate any facility which
may discharge pollutants into navigable waters without a
state certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1986). Additionally,
section 1341(d) allows a state to condition any certification
upon compliance with any requirement that the state agency
deems appropriate under state law. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley,
426 F.Supp. 230, 234 (S.D. Al. 1976). Since New Union ap-
plied state law in its certification of Acme's permit, it would
be inappropriate for a federal authority to review its actions.
See Roosevelt Campobello, 684 F.2d at 1056.
The majority of federal courts have held that the proper
forum to review the appropriateness of a state's certification is
state court, and that the federal courts and federal agencies
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are without authority to review the validity of the state's cer-
tification procedures. Roosevelt Campobello Int'l.. Park
Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982); U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 837-39 (7th Cir. 1977);
Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridor
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (W.D.
Pa. 1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 426 F. Supp. 230, 235
(S.D. Ala. 1976). The Mobil Oil Court summed it up best
when it held that "[slince EPA was not intended to exercise
any review over State action on certification and since no
other federal agency mayI2 4 exercise review under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, it follows that the proper fo-
rum for judicial review of state certification is in state court."
426 F. Supp. at 235.
It is clear from the discussion above that the proper fo-
rum for Acme to challenge the state certification is state
court. The district court also correctly held that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear Acme's challenge to the actual toxic-
ity limitation (R. 12).
B. The district court does not have the authority to re-
view Acme's challenge to the validity of its toxicity
limitation.
The plain language of the Clean Water Act states that the
substantive requirements of an NPDES permit are not re-
viewable in a civil or criminal enforcement proceeding. 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (1986). Where the language of a statute is
clear on its face it is to be given its plain meaning. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 107, 108
(1980). The language of section 1369(b)(2) is unambiguous,
and thus the district court correctly held that it did not have
jurisdiction to review Acme's toxicity limitation in NCPE's
enforcement action (R. 12). See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 821
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
Furthermore, Acme is also precluded from having its 1987
permit judicially reviewed because it has not exhausted its ad-
ministrative remedies as required by the Act and its regula-
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tions. See Sierra Club v. Union Oil of Cal., 813 F.2d 1480,
1487 (9th Cir. 1987). Cf. Nat'l Wildlife-25 Fed'n v. Consumers
Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 1000 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding
citizen-plaintiffs challenging effluent limitations must exhaust
administrative remedies). Section 1369(b)(1) provides that
only the federal courts of appeal may review the EPA Admin-
istrator's action in promulgating or approving an effluent limi-
tation. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E). The EPA's regulations pro-
vide however, that for the purposes of judicial review under
section 1369(b), final agency action does not occur unless and
until a party has exhausted its remedies under subparts E and
F and section 124.91. 40 C.F.R. § 124.60(g) (1987). Subparts E
and F of Part 124 detail the procedures for evidentiary and
non-adversarial review hearings respectively. While Acme has
appealed its final 1987 toxicity limitation to the EPA, the
EPA has not made a final decision on that appeal (R. 6).
Therefore, Acme has not exhausted its administrative reme-
dies and is not entitled at this point to judicial review. See
Union Oil, 813 F.2d at 1488.
Acme is further precluded from judicial review because it
has not attempted to pursue other available administrative
remedies such as seeking modification of its permit under 40
C.F.R. section 122.62 (1987). See Union Oil, 813 F.2d at 1487.
It is also impossible that Acme has complied with section
124.91 which is a prerequisite to judicial review. 40 C.F.R. §
124.60(g). Section 124.91 requires that a party make a request
to the EPA Administrator after an initial decision or recom-
mendation has been made on the appeal-L2 hearing. 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.91 (1987). The EPA has not made an initial decision on
Acme's appeal (R. 6). This requirement applies whether Acme
sought review under subpart E or F. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 124,
app. A, fig. 2 at 180-81 (1987). Thus, Acme is a long way from
exhausting its administrative remedies and would not even be
entitled to review by the court of appeals.
It is unclear whether even the EPA can review Acme's
appeal of its toxicity limitations because the EPA regulations
provide that state review procedures are to be followed when
challenges are brought on effluent limitations attributable to
state certification. 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (1987). That section
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provides: "[r]eview and appeals of limitations and conditions
attributable to State certification shall be made through the
applicable procedures of the State and may not be made
through the procedures in this part." Id. In the instant case
the toxicity limitations were deemed necessary by New Union
in its certification for meeting the state water quality stan-
dards (R. 4). Although EPA's authority to review Acme's ap-
peal is not precisely before this court, the fact that even the
EPA cannot review the toxicity limits supports the district
court's holding.
Acme's appeal of the toxicity limitations does not stay its
effect. In its appeal and challenge of the State's certification,
Acme is essentially seeking to have the toxicity limitation re-
voked (R. 4-5). This situation is distinguishable from that
with Acme's BOD and TSS limitations discussed above at
page 15. There the 1987 permit limitations are stayed pursu-
ant to 40127 C.F.R. section 124.60(c)(1) because there are 1974
limitations to be applied. This rule cannot logically be applied
to the toxicity limitations for the simple fact that there would
be no limitation in effect during the pendency of the judicial
and administrative appeals.
Holding newly promulgated effluent limitations effective
during appeal is consistent with the purposes and policy of
the Clean Water Act. First, the Act's clear intention is to pe-
nalize any discharge in violation of an NPDES permit. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(d). Secondly, if new limitations are
not held effective, the Clean Water Act's goal of prohibiting
the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts is violated.
See U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1986). If this were not the case, pol-
luters could constantly challenge new limitations and continue
to pollute the nation's waters while their appeals are tied up
in judicial and administrative tribunals. Polluters must liti-
gate these issues on their own time. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 823, 855 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf. Train v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975)
(holding that requests for a variance under the Clean Air Act
are carried out on the polluter's, not the public's time).
While Acme's appeal is pending before the EPA it contin-
ues to be liable for its toxicity violations. See Natural Re-
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sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692
F. Supp. 801, 810-11 (N.D. Ill. 1988)._128
C. The district court correctly granted summary judg-
ment for NCPE and New Union because the undis-
puted facts and evidence establish that Acme is lia-
ble for its toxicity violations.
Regardless of whether Acme's toxicity limitation is ulti-
mately held to be valid, Acme is liable for the violations of
New Union's water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(b)(1)(C), 1341(d) (1988). States may properly impose
water quality standards which are more stringent than those
required by a NPDES permit. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Ham-
mond, 726 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1140 (1985). In enacting section 1370 Congress specifically de-
clined to attempt to preempt the field of water pollution legis-
lation, and essentially invited the states to enact standards
more stringent than the federal requirements. Mianus River
Preservation Comm'n. v. Adm'r EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d
Cir. 1976). The technology-based treatment requirements
under section 301(b) of the Act represent the minimum level
of control that must be imposed in a NPDES permit. Student
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. P.D. Oil & Chem.,
627 F. Supp. 1074, 1088 (D.N.J. 1986). Where the state has
adopted water quality standards, as New Union has (R. 4),
the permit may impose stricter effluent limitations in order to
achieve those standards. P.D. Oil & Chem. 627 F. Supp. at
1088; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d). New
Union's state water quality standards included in Acme's
NPDES permit are independently enforceable and therefore
Acme's violations subject it to liability. See Chesapeake Bay
Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 631-21
(D.Md. 1987); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(d), 1311(b)(1)(C).
Acme's Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) clearly
show that it has previously, and continues to violate the toxic-
ity limitation and therefore establishes its liability. See Con-
necticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp.
1397, 1417 (D.Conn. 1987). It is well settled that DMRs may
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be used as evidence to establish a violation of a permit limita-
tion. Id. at 1416-17; Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 452 (D.Md. 1985); Student Pub
Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479,
1485 (D.N.J. 1985). One purpose of requiring DMRs is to
avoid the necessity of lengthy fact finding, investigations, and
negotiations at the time of enforcement. Enforcement of viola-
tions of requirements of the Act should be based on relatively
narrow fact situations requiring a minimum of discretionary
decision making or delay. S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3730. Therefore, the district court in the present case cor-
rectly relied upon Acme's DMRs in establishing liability for
toxicity discharge violations (R. 12).
It is uniformly held that permit-holders are strictly liable
for violations of an NPDES permit. E.g., United States v.
Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
692 F. Supp. 801, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1988). As discussed above,
where review could have been obtained under section
1369(b)(1), paragraph (2) provides that the substantive re-
quirements of Acme's NPDES permit are not reviewable in an
enforce_ 0Oment proceeding. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2). Where
there is evidence of a violation liability may properly be de-
cided through a motion for summary judgment. Outboard
Marine, 692 F. Supp. at 821; Student Public Interest Re-
search Group of N.J. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479,
1485 (D.N.J. 1985). In a case very similar to the instant one
the court granted summary judgment for the citizen-plaintiffs
based on the discharger's DMRs. Student Public Int. Re-
search Group v. P.D. Oil and Chemical, 627 F. Supp. 1074 (D.
N.J. 1986). The court specifically held that the DMRs could
properly be used as an admission in order to determine
whether a violation has occurred. Id. at 1090. Cf., United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980). Since in the present
case there is no dispute of material fact concerning Acme's
toxicity violations of its NPDES permit based upon its
DMRs, summary judgment is appropriate. See P.D. Oil, 627
F. Supp. at 1090.
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CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons it is respectfully requested
that this court reverse the district court's granting of sum-
mary judgment for Acme on it pH, BOD and TSS violations
and affirm the district court's granting of summary judgment
to NCPE and New Union on Acme's toxicity violations.
29
